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Summary
This paper uses an empirical simulation model to examine links between trade policy, pollution
and public health in Chile. Using a general equilibrium framework, we synthesize economic,
engineering, and health data in a way that elucidates this complex relationship and can support
more coherent policy in all three areas. The basic tool of analysis is a 75-sector calibrated general
equilibrium (CGE) model, incorporating monitoring functions for 13 effluent categories and a
variety of mortality and morbidity indicators. While the methodology supports more general
applications, present attention is confined to atmospheric pollution and health status in the
Santiago metropolitan area.
The trade policy scenarios examined include Chile's accession to the NAFTA,
MERCOSUR, and unilateral trade liberalization. Unilateral trade liberalization induces substantial
worsening of pollution and expansion of resource-based sectors, partly because it facilitates
access to cheaper energy. NAFTA integration is environmentally benign in terms of pollution
emissions. NAFTA accession, relative to other trade integration scenarios, actually reduces
environmental damage. This results because trade diversion reduces reliance on cheap energy,
unlike the other two trade integration scenarios.
We find that emissions of small particulates (PM-10), SO2, and NO2, have the strongest
impact on local mortality and morbidity. These three pollutants appear to be complementary in
economic activity. For several types of emissions, accession to the NAFTA appears to be
environmentally benign. MERCOSUR and unilateral liberalization have a negative effect on the
environment and upon urban morbidity and mortality. Damages due to rising morbidity and
mortality are of similar magnitude and substantial. Unilateral trade liberalization induces damages
equal to 13 percent of the income gains arising from free trade. Revenue-neutral taxes on air
pollutants induce net welfare gains from reduced health damages.
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1 Introduction
The policy significance of trade and environment linkages has increased sharply in recent years,
largely because of a higher profile in trade negotiations such as the Uruguay Round and the
NAFTA. Among academic observers, a consensus has emerged that trade policy is not an
adequate tool for environmental protection (Beghin et al. (1994)), but many other aspects of this
linkage remain contentious issues. Unfortunately, there is still relatively little empirical evidence to
inform this debate, and this is the main objective of the present paper. In particular, we seek to
quantify the direct and indirect effects of environmental taxes, including their revenue, cost, and
output effects, as well as their interaction with trade policies and their incidence upon the
environment, public health, and elsewhere in the economy. For fast growing developing
economies, greater outward-orientation holds great promise in terms of growth and efficiency.
Pursuing this goal blindly, however, may jeopardize long-term prosperity because of the
environmental costs of such a strategy. Hence, it is essential to assess the environmental impact of
trade policy generally and trade liberalization in particular, and to examine how these might be
better coordinated with environmental policies to mitigate environmental degradation.
Our paper makes two contributions. Firstly, we explicitly incorporate links from trade to
environment to public health indicators, rather than simply measuring pollution incidence or other
environmental variables. Secondly, this paper is empirical, and intended to strengthen the basis of
evidence for the rapidly evolving policy debate on trade-environment linkages (Beghin and Potier:
1997). The present paper gives empirical evidence for Chile, but the methodology can be
extended to other countries. Using an applied general equilibrium model, we investigate the
interactions between trade and environmental policies, focusing particularly on trade liberalization
and coordinated policies of effluent taxation. We provide estimates of emissions for detailed
pollution types at the national level, identifying patterns of pollution intensity that emerge with
greater outward orientation. Although we estimate increased intensities for several pollutants
when trade liberalization is undertaken without concurrent environmental taxes, none of these is
appears alarming.2
A second motivation for the present study is to make more tangible the linkages
between economic, environmental, and public health indicators, building upon recent and current
work on urban pollution and health in Santiago (World Bank (1994); Ostro et. al. (1995); O’Ryan
(1994)). This is an essential step in support of policy formulation that takes more explicit account
of economy-environment linkages. Past emphasis in this area has been on resource depletion,
which is appropriate but seriously limited, since it omits more direct and immediate personal costs
of environmental degradation. We quantify the incremental mortality and morbidity associated
with combined economic and environmental polices and their monetary damages. Because its
topology, local climate, and economic concentration make this urban area comparable to Mexico
City and Jakarta, pollution in Santiago poses a major environmental challenge to Chilean policy
makers, now and well into the next century.
In this context, we find that abatement of three air pollutants (small particulates, SO2, and
NO2 (a determinant of ozone)) has the largest impact on mortality and morbidity and far
outweighs the health benefits which might arise from abatement of other air pollutants in
Santiago. We also find that Chile’s accession to the NAFTA, compared to unilateral trade
liberalization, would reduce the emissions of many pollutants and have a relatively benign effect
on urban public health. Unilateral liberalization, by contrast, would appear to induce a significant
transfer of pollution capacity to Chile from the Rest of the World, adversely affecting the
environment and public health. Here the case for coordination with environmental policy is
compelling indeed.
Until 1975, Chile represented a textbook case of import-substitution, replete with trade
distortions, slow growth, foreign exchange restrictions and resulting misallocation of resources.
Following a series of policy reforms under the structural adjustment of the 1980s, Chile has
become a thriving outward-oriented economy (Papageorgiou et al.; World Bank). Growth of
output and exports has been spectacular in natural resource-based industries such as agriculture,
fisheries, forestry, and mining sectors in which Chile has traditionally been competitive. These
expansions have fostered rising living standards and concerns for the environmental consequences
of the resource intensity of the growth (World Bank). 3
In parallel, urbanization is already well advanced in Chile, where about 85 percent of the
population live in or within the vicinity of major cities (for example, Santiago Metropolitan Area
and Valparaiso). The income growth and rapid urbanization have outpaced the development of
infrastructures such as paved roads, public transportation equipment and sewage treatment
systems. Several environmental problems in urban areas are linked to the poor road infrastructure
and the use of untreated wastewater used in irrigated agriculture (World Bank (1994)).
The infrastructure problem exacerbates air pollution in Santiago by contributing to
emissions of suspended particulates and other effluents in the air. This problem combined with
unique topological and climatic conditions (thermal inversion) put Santiago in the league of the
most-polluted cities in the world. Rising income and heath concerns are at odds with this
situation. With the assistance of international organizations, Chile has started addressing these
environmental problems, especially, air and water pollution in Santiago, and the depletion of
forest resources (see World Bank (1994)).
A critical mass of information has recently been accumulated on urban pollution in
Santiago (O'Ryan (1994); Sanchez (1992); Turner et al. (1993); and World Bank (1994)); we
make use of this information when we link national pollution estimates to pollution concentrations
in Santiago. Our study is a useful contribution to the existing work on Santiago because it
provides estimates of pollution emissions at the national level and of their variations induced by
policy changes.
2 The TEQUILA Model
The Trade and Environment eQUILibrium Analysis (TEQUILA) model is a prototype
computable general equilibrium model developed at the OECD development Centre for research
on sustainable development. The full model is described in details in Beghin et al. (1996). The
TEQUILA model is recursive dynamic: each period is solved as a static equilibrium problem given
an allocation of savings and expenditure on current consumption. It is multi-sectoral (75 sectors
for Chile) with careful disaggregation of natural-resource-based sectors and their forward linkages
to manufacturing. Natural resource activities include five agricultural sectors, forestry, fisheries,
and five mining/extraction sectors. Their linkages to manufacturing are captured by twelve4
agricultural processing sectors, four wood-based sectors, four oil-based chemical industries, and
eight mineral-based ones.
Output is characterized by CRS technology and the structure of production consists of a
series of nested CES functions. Final output is determined from the combination of (non-energy)
intermediate inputs and a composite bundle of energy and value added (labor, and capital
(machinery and land)). Non-energy intermediate inputs are assumed to be utilized in fixed
proportions with respect to total non-energy intermediate demand. The energy-value-added
bundle is further decomposed into a labor aggregate, and a capital-energy bundle. Labor demand
is further decomposed into ten occupations. The capital-energy bundle is further disaggregated
into capital demand and demand for an energy aggregate. The energy bundle is itself decomposed
into four base fuel components. In this production structure, emissions are linked to intermediate
consumption (inputs) rather than final output. Figure 1 shows the nested structure of production.
Most existing CGE models investigating pollution issues assume fixed proportion between
sectoral output and emissions associated with that sector. By contrast, we posit substitution
possibilities between value added, energy and non-energy intermediate goods, which allow the
decrease of pollution associated with production if pollution taxes are put in place. This is a major
improvement in the incorporation of pollution in economywide modeling.
We econometrically estimate the pollution effluents by sector as being function of energy
and input use (Dessus et al.). Estimates of these input-based effluents intensities are obtained by
matching data from a social accounting matrix disaggregated at the 4-digit ISIC level to the
corresponding IPPS pollution database of The World Bank (Martin et al.). Emissions are
generated by both the final consumption and the intermediate use of polluting goods.
Excise/effluent taxes are used to achieve pollution abatement. These taxes are measured as unit of
currency per unit of emissions and are uniform taxes per unit of effluent for all sectors. Since
every sector has different effluent intensities, the pollution tax, expressed per unit of output, varies
across sectors. The latter  taxes are tacked on to the producer price of the polluting commodity.
Pollution by sector is characterized by a vector of 13 measures of various water, air and
soil effluents. Pollution intensity varies by sector and with relative prices, since the use of “dirty”
inputs is influenced by relative price changes induced by policy intervention. The 13 pollution5
measures include: toxic pollutants in water, air and land (TOXAIR, TOXWAT, TOXSOL); bio-
accumulative toxic metals in air, soil, and water (BIOAIR, BIOWAT, BIOSOL); air pollutants
such as SO2, NO2, CO2, volatile organic compounds (VOC), and particulate intensity (PART);
and finally, water pollution measured by biological oxygen demand (BOD), and total suspended
solids (TSS).
We calibrate the TEQUILA model using a detailed social accounting matrix of Chile for
1992. The model is neoclassical with all markets reaching equilibrium. Trade is modeled assuming
goods are differentiated with respect to region of origin and destination. On the import side, we
account for the heterogeneity of imports and domestic goods with the CES specification
attributed to Armington. We assume a CET specification for domestic output, in which producers
are assumed to differentiate between the domestic and export markets. We assume that Chile is a
small country. Trade distortions are expressed as ad valorem tariffs. This assumption is consistent
with the recent tariffication of most trade distortions in Chile following its structural reforms.
3 A Brief Description of The Santiago Health Model
2
This section briefly describes how we map predicted pollution emissions from our
simulations into health effects for residents of Santiago and then ascribe monetary damages to
health impacts of pollution. In summary, the model estimates the change in health status
associated with a change in major air pollutants by each of 72 industrial activities in Santiago.
Changes in industry emissions used are obtained from the economywide model. The health effects
model transforms these emissions data into corresponding changes in health status (e.g., reduction
in PM-10 related mortality). In so doing, the health effects component is used to estimate the
potential health damage savings (costs) corresponding to alternative trade and environment policy
scenarios analyzed by the economywide model.
In characterizing emissions, we use baseline information on major air pollutants and
emission sources. This step involves collecting data on pollutants known to cause significant
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health problems in Santiago, the corresponding emission sources, and baseline average annual
emissions and ambient concentration levels. The data are used to estimate the portion of
economywide emissions attributable to Santiago, as well as calibrate the health module of the
CGE model to initial conditions.
Dispersion modeling maps effluent emissions into ambient concentration levels, and
population-weighted concentration levels are used to determine exposure rates for health impacts.
The next step involves calculating the health status response to changes in concentrations of air
pollutants. Dose response functions express the change in incidence of mortality/morbidity
induced by changes in pollution concentrations (Ostro et al.:1995). The figures on health end-
points presented in the results section should be interpreted as increases or decreases in mortality
and morbidity with respect to the mortality and morbidity that would have prevailed at a
predetermined safe standard of pollution concentrations. We look at various morbidity and
mortality indicators:
1. Premature mortality due to PM-10, SO2, and ozone
2. Premature mortality in males of age 40-59 due to lead
3. Respiratory hospital admissions (for PM-10, ozone)
4. Emergency room visit (for PM-10)
5. Restricted activity days (for PM-10)
6. Lower respiratory illness for children population of age less than 17 (PM-10)
7. Asthma symptoms for asthmatic population (for PM-10, ozone)
8. Respiratory symptoms (for PM-10, ozone)
9. Chronic bronchitis in population of age 25 or older (for PM-10)
10. Minor restricted activity days (for ozone)
11. Respiratory symptoms in children population (for SO2)
12. Chest discomfort in adult population (for SO2)
13. Respiratory symptoms in adult population (for NO2)
14. Eye irritation in adult population (for ozone)
15. Number of headache in adult population (for CO)
16. IQ decrement in children population (for lead)
17. Cases of hypertension in adult male population (for lead)
18. Non-fatal heart attacks in male population age 40-59 (for lead)7
The last step is to attach a monetary value to the health impact figures. We follow a
willingness-to-pay approach to valuing morbidity and loss of life due to a change in mortality,
relying on the large body of information and data on such measures for industrialized economies
to econometrically estimate these damages for Chile. Damages due to mortality are based on the
value of a statistical life, which indicates the aggregate valuation by individuals of reducing the
risk of dying. For Santiago, our estimate is roughly .55 million dollars per life, in 1992
(purchasing power parity) US dollars. This estimate corresponds to the value of a life reached in
2010 under the reference business-as-usual scenario (Bowland:1997).
Because of the scarcity of corresponding morbidity estimates available for industrialized
countries, our morbidity willingness-to-pay measures are less sophisticated. Available estimates
from industrialized countries were simply scaled down to reflect the per capita income differences
between Chile and these industrialized countries, expressed in (PPP) 1992 US dollars.
4 Policy  Reform Scenarios 
The time horizon of the simulations is the period 1992-2010. Every year, savings determine the
pool of new investment resources for the next period and the model solves for an equilibrium.
This equilibrium determines savings going to the new investment pool for the subsequent period.
Each period, sectoral resource allocation adjusts to new prices. Labor moves freely across
sectors; existing capital is reallocated across sectors, but to a lesser extent due to a partial
mobility (vintage capital) assumption in the model.  The endogenous variables of interest, which
adjust at every period, are sectoral inputs, factor use, and output, consumption, trade, pollution
emissions associated with production and consumption. Aggregate real income serves as an
approximate gauge of welfare or economic efficiency. We do not attempt to measure the cost of
pollution and characterize “externalities” only by the level of pollution emissions estimated in
each scenario.
We first define a reference trajectory for the economy based on DRI-McGraw-Hill
predictions of GDP growth until 2010. Factor and energy productivity changes are endogenously
determined such that the GDP forecast and the model are consistent with each other. All policies8
are held constant in this reference scenario, called the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. For the
years 1992 to 2010, the model gives us reference trajectory base for output, absorption, trade,
and pollution emissions, for this BAU scenario. This is the base or reference trajectory of the
economy for our analysis.  All reported results are expressed in deviations (in percent) from this
BAU scenario and for 2010, which is the final year of the simulation exercise.
The first reform scenario imposes taxes on pollutants, one at the time
3. Each tax is such
that the emissions of the targeted pollutant progressively decrease over time and reach a 25
percent decrease relative to its level in the BAU results by 2010. The phasing in of these taxes is
set to obtain gradual reductions of 10 percent in 1995, 15 percent in 2000, 20 percent in 2005,
and 25 percent in 2010. The tax rates per unit of effluent are the shadow prices of the quantitative
constraints on the pollution emissions.
The second scenario considers a gradual trade integration, combining unilateral trade
liberalization through tariff  reductions, with a concurrent but modest improvement of terms of
trade. Terms of trade are parametric for Chile, assumed to be a small country, and the terms of
trade improvement is introduced as an exogenous shock. We assume that export prices increase
to simulate this improvement that should result from the integration of trading countries. This is
equivalent to an improvement of the terms of trade. We decrease the ad-valorem tariffs,
progressively to free trade, from their reference levels (1992) as 90 percent of original tariffs in
1995, 60 percent in 2000, 30 percent in 2005, and no tariff in 2010. Terms-of-trade improvements
are expressed as an increase in observed world prices for exports by 2 percent in 1995, 4 percent
in 2000, 7 percent in 2005, and 10 percent in 2010. The terms-of-trade assumption allows us to
see how the environment is affected by an outward-oriented growth strategy.
We consider analogous regional integration and liberalization scenarios with NAFTA and
MERCOSUR countries. Disaggregated data on trade flows allow us to consider these alternative
trade liberalization scenarios. In these two other trade scenarios, we remove tariffs and increase
export prices following a similar progression as in the previous scenario, but only with respect to
trading partners which are members of these two regional agreements. Our objective is to impose9
a sizable trade shock on the Chilean economy to estimate changes in sectoral composition of
production and trade. These changes determine the pollution emitted and induced by the outward
trade orientation.
The last group of reform scenarios combines the first two types of reforms. For this last
scenario, the objective is to investigate the implications of coordinated trade and environment
policies. Analytical results (Copeland; and Beghin et al. (1997)) imply that the coordinated
piecemeal approach -gradual changes of two instruments to correct for trade and environmental
distortions- leads to welfare improvements. In the context of joint trade and environmental
reforms, efficiency gains are obtained because trade distortions are reduced and because
environmental degradation can be reduced as well. Recall we want to investigate the effect of
such joint reform on sectoral allocation, trade, and pollution abatement. Free trade removes
border distortions (domestic border  prices are equal to world prices) and the incentives to change
input mixes to abate pollution in production have been altered, compared to the case of the single
environmental reform. The differences in the incentive structures lead one to expect contrasting
results concerning the indirect abatement achieved via complementarity and substitution among
emission types, which occurs under the two scenarios.
5 Results from Policy Reform Simulations
Results follow the sequence of the three reform scenarios: environmental tax reform, trade
integration (unilateral liberalization, NAFTA, and MERCOSUR), and then combined trade
integration and environmental protection. Results are presented for the final year, 2010, in percent
deviations from their BAU values. Table 1 summarizes the salient results of the simulations in
aggregate. Table 2 shows the effects of the various scenarios on pollution emissions. A longer
report is available upon request. We first note some stylized facts emerging from the Social
Accounting Matrix on sectors which appear to be pollution hot-spots in Chile. The following
sectors exhibit high intensities and levels for several effluent types: agriculture, sugar refining,
mining, chemicals, metals, pottery, electricity, gas, and transportation sectors.
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5.1 Effluent taxes
Effluent taxes have a small negative impact on growth except for the tax on bio-accumulative
emissions released in water (BIOWAT), which has a larger impact (an 8.1 percent decrease in
GDP over 18 years with respect to what it would have been under BAU). The effects of these
taxes on other aggregate measures of economic activity tend to be small as well, with the same
exception of the tax on BIOWAT. Trade decreases by about 10 percent and investment decreases
by 23 percent. Next we look at sectoral output effects. For the first four taxes (all three toxics,
BIOAIR), fish and seafood output increase significantly (increases of 60 to 193 percent). For the
same effluent taxes, mining activities decrease sharply (-17 to -60 percent). The tax on BIOWAT,
which induces the largest decrease in aggregate output, has a negative effect on virtually all
sectors, and it especially has a strong effect on iron, coal, and basic metals (-30 to -59 percent).
Trade contracts with the effluent taxes. At the sectoral levels, trade effects are mixed
(some decreases, some increases) and moderate. Some exceptions arise: imports and exports of
fish increase by over 100 percent for the taxes on toxic pollution; imports of wine and liquors
increase by 120 percent with the tax on VOC. The same VOC tax has a strong negative impact on
many pollution-intensive manufacturing exports (furniture, chemicals, petroleum refining, and
rubber).
The simulations results indicate that the impact of the taxes on pollution abatement is
diverse. Strong complementarities are observed in several subsets of the 13 effluent types, despite
the clear possibility of substitution among pollution emissions implied by our model since we do
not impose any fixed proportions between output and emissions. An increase in the tax on one
effluent induces a decrease in another effluent level. All toxics are such a group, so are all bio-
accumulative emissions, and NO2, SO2 and PART(PM-10). The larger subset of toxics and bio-
accumulative emissions follows such a pattern. More intriguing is the presence, in the aggregate,
of substitution possibilities among effluents. For example, SO2 and NO2 are substitutes for TSS
and for bio-accumulative emissions in air and soil.
The tax rates implied by the targeted decrease in emissions are realistic: on average the
pollution tax per unit of sectoral output is 4 percent or less for all 13 scenarios. The individual tax
rates (per sector and by effluent) vary from zero to less than 15 percent for all 13 scenarios,11
except for the scenario targeting reduction in VOC. In the latter scenario the pollution tax rate on
wine and liquors jumps to 52 percent, and the corresponding tax rate on  furniture products is 37
percent.  These high rates are caused by the fact that these two sectors account for most of the
VOC pollution in production.
The decomposition of abatement into scale (aggregate output expansion), composition
(composition of GDP), and technique (input substitution) effects reveals interesting results (see
Copeland and Taylor for such an analytical decomposition). First, the composition effect seems
overwhelming both in the abatement in production and consumption. The effect is more
substantial in production than in consumption, that is, imports substitute for domestic output in
pollution-intensive sectors. The technical effect in production is moderate, and the scale effect is
marginal for most pollutants except for the case of the tax on BIOWAT (production scale effect
of -8.1 percent). Surprisingly, a few simulations exhibit positive scale effects in production
abatement (all toxics, BIOAIR, BIOSOL, and BOD). Since the scale effect is an aggregate output
effect over all sectors, the latter result may be due to the expansion of activities that are not
intensive in the pollutants being taxed. This expansion, weighted by prices, outweighs the
decrease in output in polluting sectors. For example, the taxes on all three toxics decrease mining
activities as well as metallic industries, but stimulate fisheries and seafood, and forestry and wood
products.
This example shows the limitation of tackling environmental degradation by type of
pollution effluent. Abatement of one effluent gives rise to an increase in resource-intensive
activities such as forestry and may induce additional degradation and welfare losses if externalities
are present in these sectors. This insight reinforces the finding that targeting one specific pollutant
can have unintended and damaging consequences on emissions of “substitute” pollutants, and
calls for an integrated approach to the design of environmental policies.
In addition, the decomposition of abatement sheds light on the substitutability between
effluents. A variety of patterns emerges. Substitution between two effluent types occurs when all
three effects are positive (for example, TSS response to tax on TOXWAT), or when two or less
out of the three effects are positive and larger in magnitude than the remaining effect(s) (for
example CO2 response to BOD tax).12
The impact of the effluent taxes on the concentration in Santiago is diverse and to some
extent, follows the complementarity/substitution patterns observed for emissions. As shown in
Table V.4a, all three toxic taxes provide significant decreases in lead (about 10 percent), but
nothing else, except for a slight increase in CO concentration (1.1 percent). The three bio-
accumulative pollution taxes decrease lead concentrations as well (by 10 to 20 percent). The tax
on BIOWAT has negative and sometime large effects on other concentrations as well -remember
it is the tax which has the largest negative scale effects among the effluent taxes. Air pollution
taxes also produce similar concentration patterns. Emission taxes on either NO2, SO2, or PM-10
leads to a substantial decrease in the other two (averaging about 19 percent), and some decrease
in CO (averaging about 5 percent). Taxes on CO and VOC also achieve substantial decreases in
concentration in Santiago. The taxes on water pollution (BOD, TSS) have marginal impact on
most of the concentrations.
As shown in Table 3, the health endpoints changes are striking for the taxes on SO2, NO2,
and PM-10. Premature mortality due to PM-10, SO2 and ozone decreases by more than 30
percent. With these three taxes, most endpoints show improvements with decreases of morbidity
of about 30 percent for seven of the morbidity measures. There is a marginal deterioration of
morbidity incidence linked to lead (about 1 percent). This result is the consequence of the slight
increase in BIOAIR emissions induced by the taxes on SO2 and NO2 (around 4 percent).
Table 4 presents the health damages reduction induced by the environmental taxes. The
tax on PM-10 induces a decrease in monetary damages equivalent to .82 percent of the BAU
2010 GDP; taxes on SO2 and NO2 reduce damages by an amount equivalent to .65 percent of 
BAU 2010 GDP. The latter taxes induce net gains as approximated by the loss of aggregate
income plus the reduction in damages. These results show the importance of accounting for
nonmarket benefits when considering the impact of environmental taxes. The estimated welfare
gains are lower-bound estimates because the decreases in morbidity and mortality are only applied
to Santiago’s population.  As suggested by  the Table some taxes such as the tax on VOC induce
negligible net gains in welfare.13
5.2 Trade Integration
We look at two types of trade integration leading to three scenarios: with the world (unilateral
liberalization), and regional integration (NAFTA, and MERCOSUR). Unilateral liberalization
induces the largest increase in GDP (+5.6 percent), followed by NAFTA (1.4 percent) and
MERCOSUR (0.6 percent). These gains are small -they represent the relative gains over 18 years.
These small changes originate in the outward-orientation Chile has been following; large gains
from liberalization have already occurred. Nevertheless these reforms have more significant
positive impacts on aggregate trade and aggregate gross investment.
Moving to sectoral output effects, the three trade reforms exhibit sharp contrast. The
unilateral trade reform stimulates the output of fruit, forestry, iron, other mining, food processing,
wood products, paper, and petroleum refining. Conversely, petroleum and gas production,
chemicals, glass and other manufacturing contract with free trade. With NAFTA integration, fruit,
agricultural services, other mining, food processing, wine and liquor, would expand significantly,
whereas copper, iron, and paper would decrease. Hence, NAFTA integration departs significantly
from free trade in terms of international specialization. MERCOSUR integration does not induce
any strong effect, except for a major increase in transportation material and a decrease in fish and
seafood.
The trade effects of these reforms are as follows. The unilateral reform induces major
increases in virtually all sectoral imports and exports, except for imports of chemicals, glass, and
other manufacturing. NAFTA integration has a smaller effect on trade than unilateral reform,
except for noticeable increases in imports of agriculture and sugar, and smaller increases for
livestock, forestry, fish, mining sectors, sugar, wood products, furniture, paper, and plastic;
exports of fruits, mining (other than copper, coal, and iron), dairy, wine and liquor, furniture, and
pottery.
Finally, the MERCOSUR integration induces increases in imports of agricultural products,
iron, oils, sugar, tobacco, petroleum refining, and metals; imports of fish would decrease. On the
export side, substantial reductions occur in exports of fish, iron, and seafood; but food processing,
chemicals, plastics, and printing expand significantly.14
The pollution implications of these trade reforms are next. Unilateral liberalization is
pollution intensive, e.g., NO2, SO2, and PM-10 have an elasticity of 3.5 with respect to GDP
increases induced by this unilateral reform. By contrast, MERCOSUR and NAFTA have elasticity
values around 2.7 and 2.2 respectively, for the same effluents. NAFTA integration induces
decreases in several pollutants (the three toxics, BIOAIR, BIOSOL, and BOD). MERCOSUR
induces a decrease in TSS only. The trade diversion of NAFTA integration provides a significant
environmental benefit in terms of mitigated emissions, relative to other two trade liberalization
scenarios. This is a overlooked insight on trade diversion in presence of externalities. The
decrease in effluents under the NAFTA scenario is achieved through strong composition effects in
production, outweighing the scale expansion induced by NAFTA. By contrast, the unilateral trade
liberalization induces higher intensities in SO2, NO2, and PART (PM-10) via strong technical
effects towards pollution-intensive input combinations.
Still under free trade, we observe marginal increases for all toxics, BIOAIR, CO2, VOC,
and BOD; we have marginal decreases for TSS, and BIOSOL. Finally, we see substantial
increases for PM-10, SO2, and NO2. These increases are observed after 18 years of expected
growth and hence do not represent anything dramatic. By contrast, NAFTA membership induces
decreases in pollution intensity of GDP or production. This difference between the two trade
reforms is caused by the cheap energy import occurring under free trade but not under NAFTA.
For the health end-points in Santiago, the unilateral trade liberalization scenario has
negative consequences for both mortality and almost all measures of morbidity. Premature
mortality due to PM-10, ozone, and SO2 increases by 25 percent and premature death in males of
age 40-59 due to lead increases by 9.2 percent, as shown in Table 3. Morbidity increases range
from 9 percent for cases of hypertension and non-fatal heart attacks to about 26 percent for chest
discomfort episodes and respiratory symptoms in children. NAFTA and MERCOSUR induce
marginal increases in the health end-points. Although NAFTA decreases several types of
emissions, these decreases do not translate into major gains for urban health because these
improvements are not relevant for air pollution in Santiago, except for a small improvement in
lead concentration. The damages associated with the health incidences are substantial for the
unilateral trade liberalization. As suggested by Table 4, the damages represent 13 percent of the
aggregate income gains induced by trade liberalization (damages as percent of gains in GDP). By15
contrast the damages under the NAFTA scenario are moderate due to the small deterioration of
the average health status in Santiago.
5.3 Trade Integration with Environmental Protection
In this last set of reforms, we first combine NAFTA reforms and effluent taxes on a subset of
pollutants (air pollutants). Then, we consider the unilateral trade liberalization coordinated with
effluent tax on one pollutant at the time. The effluent taxes are designed as in the first set of
scenarios on environmental reforms (incremental and leading to a 25-percent decrease in
emissions of the taxed effluent). The tax rates corresponding to these reforms are slightly higher
than in the environmental reforms alone. The average tax rates on pollution, expressed in percent
of the producer price per unit of output, do not exceed 5.8 percent. A few individual rates
increase sharply . For instance, The tax on TOXWAT emitted by nonmetallic minerals increases
to 23.6 percent. As expected, the tax rates on VOC for wine and  liquor and for furniture
products increase further to 73 and 53 percent, respectively. These increases in tax rates originate
in the output and pollution expansion induced by trade liberalization. The pollution expansion
requires higher tax rates to be abated back to the level corresponding to a 25 percent decrease
with respect to the BAU level.
The aggregate effect of the combined reforms (NAFTA cum effluent tax) is small in
general, but differs according to the pollutant considered. For example, the effluent tax on CO2
has practically no effect on aggregate measures, whereas, the tax on VOC has a negative impact
on production, consumption and real income. The sectoral variation is more insightful. The iron
ore, petro-gas and petroleum refining sectors decrease considerably for several of the effluent
taxes. The VOC tax drastically reduces the output of wine and liquors, and of chemicals. Finally,
the tax on BIOAIR (lead) induces an expansion of fish, seafood and fruit, but a strong contraction
of copper.
The net trade effects of the combined NAFTA and environmental policy reform are next.
Specifically, imports of fruits, iron ore, coal, other mining, nonmetallic minerals, electricity and
transportation increase for most effluent taxes; conversely, imports of petro-gas and petroleum
refining decrease. Exports of fish, iron ore, seafood, food processing, feeds, paper, petroleum
refining, glass, nonmetallic minerals, and transportation decrease.16
 The pollution abatement figures, including the multiplier effects of the tax on pollutants
that are not directly targeted by the tax, are surprisingly similar to the abatement figures for the
reforms limited to environmental reforms alone. The abatement on the targeted emission is of
course exactly similar by design, but the indirect abatement of the other pollutants does not have
to be because relative prices are different under the two scenarios. The result is surprising because
changing border prices affects specialization and hence pollution. This result is due to the fact that
NAFTA integration has a mitigated impact on the Chilean environment.
The impact of coordinated reforms -free trade cum environmental taxes- appears almost
additive on aggregate output, trade and consumption: the aggregate effect of the coordinated
approach is the sum of aggregate effect of the two individual reforms. This is a recurrent result in
this type of simulation exercise (Lee and Roland-Holst; Beghin, Roland-Holst and van der
Mensbrugghe (1995) and (1997B)). However, the disaggregated output and trade figures reveal
more interesting, if not surprising, and diverse patterns. For example, iron ore output increases by
51 percent with trade liberalization and decreases by 14 percent with the tax on SO2. Nonetheless,
the combined reform (free trade + SO2 tax) induces an marginal increase in output of 1.4 percent!
This diversity of patterns comes from the difference in relative cost of abatement by increasing
imports (composition) and by changing the input mix (technical effect) under different policy
regimes. Output of fish, seafood, and wood products increases considerably for several of the free
trade cum effluent tax scenarios.
Aggregate trade expands less under the coordinated reforms than under the simple
unilateral trade liberalization, although some sectoral import induced by the latter reform, grow
even more under the coordinated scenario. For instance, imports of fish are larger under the
combined scenario than under the free trade scenario. These exacerbated surges are explained by
the almost additive effects of the two policies: free trade and environmental protection imply the
same international specialization. For example, fish imports increases significantly with the
environmental reforms and with free trade. However, the effect under coordinated policies is
lower than the sum of the individual one.
The inventory of emissions tends to duplicate the patterns reached under the single
effluent tax reform since we target the amount of pollution in a similar fashion (-25 percent for17
each effluent type). Nevertheless, the substitution between bio-accumulative and toxic pollutants
as a group and the air pollutants (SO2, NO2, VOC, PM-10, and CO2) as another group is
amplified by free trade. This increased substitution is caused by a selective increase in pollution
dictated by the change in relative prices of pollutants when only one type of pollutant is taxed. For
instance, the copper and other-mining sectors decrease their activity for the combined scenario
targeting toxic and bio-accumulative emissions, but increase their activities under the four
coordinated scenarios targeting SO2, NO2, PM-10 and CO2. VOC emissions increase under most
scenarios except the one which taxes VOC emissions.
Finally, as indicated by Table 3, the urban health impact of the coordinated reforms
reflects these stronger substitutions between broad groups of pollutants. Mortality due to air
pollution increases dramatically under the combined scenarios involving bio-accumulative and
toxic pollution, because the emissions of PM-10, SO2, and NO2 are stimulated. Similarly, the
morbidity induced by SO2, NO2, PM-10 and CO increases under the same combined scenarios.
The VOCs-ozone increases have a negative effect on many morbidity measures: increase in
restricted activity days, in the number of asthma attacks, respiratory symptoms, in minor restricted
activity days, and in eye irritation cases. As shown in the last part of Table 4, damages reductions
under coordinated reforms are less substantial than under the environmental tax alone, because of
the substitution forces at work among pollutant types. For example, damages caused by lead
pollution are substantial in the coordinated scenario involving a tax on PM-10. Nevertheless, the
net welfare gains of combined reforms are much higher than for trade liberalization alone. For
example, the tax on PM-10 combined to free trade induces net welfare gains which are 14 percent
higher than  the net gains under free trade alone.
6 Conclusions
This paper seeks to elucidate linkages between trade, environment, and public health status in an
outward-oriented economy. From our results, it is apparent that such linkages are quite complex,
and policy makers relying on intuition alone are unlikely to achieve anything close to optimality.
Policies in all three areas are clearly interdependent, and better coordination could reduce the
social and economic costs of economic growth and environmental mitigation. More detailed
empirical work is needed, however, to support such policies.18
Trade liberalization scenarios offer different outcomes in terms of growth, international
division of labor and environmental consequences. Integration into NAFTA is relatively benign to
the environment and has the smallest pollution elasticity with respect to the trade-induced growth
(the percentage change in pollution with respect to the percentage change in GDP). Unilateral
trade liberalization, with no abatement policy, induces higher growth and patterns of
specialization more adverse towards the environment, leading to detrimental impacts on public
health in Santiago and considerable monetary damages associated with the negative health impact.
MERCOSUR simulations do not indicate substantial changes in income, pollution or public
health, except for increased emissions of bio-accumulative pollutants, and small increases in
mortality and morbidity linked to lead pollution in Santiago.
Considering effluent taxes alone, the abatement of three pollutants, SO2, NO2, and PM-10
achieves the largest decrease in both mortality and morbidity in Santiago. The health damage
reduction exceeds the foregone aggregate income and corresponds to a net welfare gain to the
Chilean economy.
Coordinated scenarios are well-grounded in economic theory and represent the best of
both worlds (efficiency gains from trade, and protected environment); they are characterized by
economic expansion and decreases in the emissions of the targeted pollutant as well as its
polluting “complements”. Nevertheless, emissions of untaxed substitute pollutants increase
considerably. These strong substitutions have a negative impact on urban health, with notable
increases in mortality and morbidity when toxic and bio-accumulative pollutants are the targets.
Further, several natural-resource based sectors expand as well, hence increasing the
dimensionality of policy coordination (trade policy, effluent taxes, natural resource management).
This is a result specific to our investigation of Chile. By contrast, our analysis of trade and
environment linkages in Mexico suggests mostly complementarity between effluent types (Beghin
et al. (1995) and (1997b)).
The observed substitutability among pollutant types and its implications for urban health
raises two additional coordination and targeting issues. The first one is the coordination of
environmental programs targeting subgroups of pollutants (e.g., toxic, bio-accumulative, air
criteria pollutants). Given the substantial substitutability between these groups, an integrated19
approach to environmental reform encompassing all major groups of pollutants appears
appropriate to avoid unintended environmental degradation or negative health consequence.
The other issue is the hopeful observation that strong complementarities exist within some
groups of pollutants and that a policy targeting any pollutant within a group would achieve
substantial abatement in most emission types included in the group. This finding is common to
most of our case studies and emerges as an empirical regularity in these linkages.
 Another regularity shared by this study and the other case studies using the same
methodology is the relatively low cost of pollution abatement in terms of foregone aggregate
income. In this specific case of Chile and Santiago, we establish this result in terms of welfare.
The monetary damages equivalent to the health impact of air pollution are greatly reduced by
environmental taxes, especially by the tax on PM-10, NO2, and SO2 , such that the these welfare
gains exceed the loss of GDP induced by the taxes. A net welfare gain emerges. This statement
should be qualified because the resource reallocation implied by the effluent taxes is substantial on
a sectoral basis and we do abstract from explicit adjustment cost.
The observed substitutability among pollutant types raises two additional coordination and
targeting issues. The first one is the coordination of environmental programs targeting subgroups
of pollutants (e.g., toxic, bio-accumulative, air criteria pollutants). Given the substantial
substitutability between these groups, an integrated approach to environmental reform
encompassing all major groups of pollutants appears appropriate to avoid unintended
environmental degradation. 
The other interesting point is the hopeful observation that strong complementarities also
exist within some groups of pollutants and that a policy targeting any pollutant within a group
would achieve substantial abatement in most emission types included in that group.20
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1. Each nest represents a different CES bundle. The first argument in the CES function represents the substitution of elasticity. The
elasticity may take the value zero. Because of the putty/semi-putty specification, the nesting is replicated for each type of capital, i.e. old
and new. The values of the substitution elasticity will generally differ depending on the capital vintage, with typically lower elasticities for
old capital. The second argument in the CES function is an efficiency factor. In the case of the KE bundle, it is only applied on the
demand for capital. In the case of the decomposition of labor and energy, it is applied to all components.
2. Intermediate demand, both energy and non-energy, is further decomposed by region of origin according to the Armington specification.
However, the Armington function is specified at the border and is not industry specific.
3. The decomposition of the intermediate demand bundle, the labor bundle, and the energy bundle will be specific to the level of aggregation
of the model. The diagram represents only schematically the decomposition and is not meant to imply that there are three components in
the CES aggregation.Table 1  Impact of  Policy Reform on Aggregate Variables
Environmental Reform: Aggregate Abatement of 25% by Type of Effluent Emission
Aggregate Variables toxair Toxwa
t
Toxsol bioair Biowat biosol so2 no2 co voc part bod tss
Real GDP -0.7 -0.8 -0.7 -0.3 -8.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.7 0.0
Production 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 -8.1 0.4 -2.4 -2.4 -0.8 -3.0 -2.6 0.3 -0.1
Consumption -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 -1.6 0.0 -1.3 -1.3 -0.2 -1.8 -1.3 -0.4 0.0
Investment -2.1 -2.6 -2.2 -0.8 -23.2 -0.7 -1.3 -1.3 -0.4 -2.0 -1.5 -2.3 -0.1
Exports -1.6 -1.9 -1.7 -1.0 -10.2 -0.8 -3.1 -3.1 -0.6 -2.1 -3.2 -1.7 0.0
Imports -1.2 -1.4 -1.3 -0.7 -9.6 -0.5 -3.0 -3.0 -0.5 -1.7 -3.1 -1.3 0.0
Labor Supply -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -3.1 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0
Capital Supply -0.9 -1.1 -0.9 -0.4 -10.4 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 -0.2 -0.7 -0.7 -1.0 0.0
Real Income -0.3 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 -1.3 0.0 -1.2 -1.2 -0.1 -2.5 -1.2 -0.4 0.0
Absorption -0.8 -1.0 -0.8 -0.2 -7.1 -0.2 -1.2 -1.2 -0.2 -1.7 -1.2 -0.8 0.0
Trade Policy Reform
a Combined NAFTA and Environmental Policy Reform
b
Aggregate Variables lib2 Nafta2 Mercosu Bioairn so2n No2n con vocn partn
Real GDP 5.6 1.4 0.6 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.4 0.9 1.1
Production 7.3 1.6 0.6 1.8 -1.1 -1.1 0.7 -1.8 -1.4
Consumption 9.2 2.1 0.9 2.1 0.6 0.6 1.8 -0.1 0.6
Investment 17.7 4.3 1.8 3.5 2.7 2.7 3.7 1.9 2.4
Exports 18.0 3.6 2.7 2.7 0.1 0.1 2.9 1.2 -0.1
Imports 29.1 6.0 3.9 5.3 2.4 2.4 5.3 3.9 2.3
Labor Supply 2.0 0.8 0.2 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.6 1.0
Capital Supply 7.2 1.7 0.7 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.5 0.9 0.9
Real Income 8.6 2.0 0.8 2.1 0.6 0.6 1.9 -0.9 0.6
Absorption 10.5 2.4 1.0 2.3 1.1 1.1 2.2 0.5 1.0
aReflects unilateral trade liberalization, NAFTA integration and MERCOSUR integration by 2010 with no explicit environmental policy reforms.
       
bReflects combined policy reforms of NAFTA integration and aggregate abatement of 25% by type of effluent emission.Table 1 (continued)
Unilateral Trade with Aggregate Abatement of 25% by Type of Effluent Emission
Aggregate Variables toxairl Toxwa
tl
toxsoll bioairl biowatl biosoll so2l no2l col voc partl bodl tssl
Real GDP 4.7 4.4 4.7 5.3 -7.4 5.4 5.2 5.2 5.5 4.9 5.0 4.7 5.6
Production 7.8 7.5 7.8 7.9 -5.9 7.9 2.9 2.9 5.5 2.4 2.5 7.8 7.1
Consumption 8.7 8.4 8.7 9.1 6.3 9.1 6.7 6.7 8.6 6.0 6.7 8.6 9.2
Investment 14.4 13.3 14.4 16.9 -21.9 17.1 14.9 14.9 16.6 13.9 14.5 14.3 17.6
Exports 16.4 15.9 16.4 17.0 0.2 17.5 11.7 11.8 16.2 13.5 11.6 16.3 17.9
Imports 27.9 27.4 27.9 28.3 10.5 28.9 22.2 22.3 27.3 24.7 22.2 27.9 29.1
Labor Supply 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 -2.9 1.9 2.4 2.4 2.2 1.9 2.3 1.7 2.0
Capital Supply 6.1 5.7 6.0 6.9 -9.6 6.9 6.2 6.2 6.9 6.0 6.0 6.0 7.2
Real Income 8.2 7.9 8.1 8.6 6.1 8.6 6.2 6.3 8.2 4.4 6.3 8.1 8.6
Absorption 9.3 8.8 9.3 10.3 -1.8 10.3 8.2 8.2 9.9 7.5 8.1 9.3 10.57.1.1 Table 2:  Impact of Policy Reforms on National Effluent Emissions
Aggregate Abatement of 25% by Type of Effluent Emission
toxair toxwat toxsol Bioair Biowat biosol So2 no2 co voc part bod tss
Effluent Emissions
TOXAIR -25.0 -27.4 -25.0 -15.7 -11.9 -14.5 0.9 0.7 0.9 -0.1 0.8 -25.2 0.1
TOXWAT -22.7 -25.0 -22.7 -13.8 -11.5 -12.8 -0.5 -0.6 0.7 -1.2 -0.5 -22.9 0.1
TOXSOL -25.0 -27.4 -25.0 -15.4 -12.2 -14.3 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.1 -25.2 0.1
BIOAIR -29.5 -31.5 -29.1 -25.0 -18.7 -19.8 4.4 4.1 -4.5 2.0 0.4 -29.1 -3.0
BIOWAT -2.0 -2.3 -2.0 -1.7 -25.0 -0.7 -0.3 -0.2 -4.1 -1.5 -3.0 -2.1 -2.0
BIOSOL -37.3 -39.9 -36.8 -27.3 -13.7 -25.0 4.2 3.8 1.6 3.7 4.1 -36.9 0.0
SO2 -0.6 -1.4 -0.5 0.4 -5.2 0.2 -25.0 -25.0 -4.1 -10.2 -25.2 -0.5 0.5
NO2 -0.6 -1.4 -0.5 0.4 -5.2 0.2 -25.0 -25.0 -4.1 -10.1 -25.3 -0.6 0.5
CO2 0.4 0.3 0.6 -5.1 -29.8 0.6 -8.0 -7.9 -25.0 -4.7 -23.6 0.6 -11.9
VOC -0.9 -1.5 -0.9 0.1 -4.0 0.1 -3.5 -3.4 -0.6 -25.0 -3.4 -0.9 0.0
PART -0.6 -1.3 -0.5 -0.2 -7.8 0.2 -23.1 -23.1 -6.2 -9.3 -25.0 -0.5 -0.8
BOD -24.7 -27.2 -24.8 -15.2 -12.2 -14.0 1.1 0.9 1.0 -0.1 1.1 -25.0 0.1
TSS 0.6 1.2 0.9 -11.7 -55.5 0.2 9.9 10.0 -47.0 0.8 -21.9 0.9 -25.0
Trade Policy Reform
a Combined NAFTA and Environmental Policy Reform
b
lib2 Nafta2 Mercosur bioairn so2n no2n con vocn partn
Effluent Emissions
TOXAIR 8.6 -1.0 3.5 -13.9 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -1.4 -0.3
TOXWAT 9.5 -0.4 3.3 -11.8 -1.2 -1.3 0.1 -2.1 -1.3
TOXSOL 8.6 -0.8 3.5 -13.5 0.2 0.0 0.1 -1.1 0.1
BIOAIR 8.4 -3.6 8.1 -25.0 1.2 0.9 -8.6 -1.5 -3.2
BIOWAT 14.8 3.6 1.4 1.9 3.2 3.2 -0.9 1.7 0.2
BIOSOL 4.0 -4.8 4.8 -27.7 -0.4 -0.7 -3.4 -0.8 -0.5
SO2 19.9 3.1 1.6 3.4 -25.0 -25.0 -1.8 -8.4 -25.2
NO2 19.8 3.2 1.6 3.4 -25.0 -25.0 -1.8 -8.3 -25.2
CO2 11.8 2.2 0.3 -2.8 -6.7 -6.7 -25.0 -3.2 -24.0
VOC 13.2 3.6 1.2 3.7 -0.4 -0.4 2.9 -25.0 -0.4
PART 18.9 3.1 1.5 2.8 -23.0 -23.0 -4.2 -7.5 -25.0
BOD 8.8 -0.8 3.5 -13.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 -1.1 0.1
TSS 2.8 1.4 -1.2 -10.0 12.6 12.6 -49.3 2.2 -22.8Table 2 (continued)
Unilateral Trade with Aggregate Abatement of 25% by Type of Effluent Emission
toxairl toxwatl toxsoll Bioairl biowatl Biosoll so2l no2l col voc partl bodl tssl
National Effluent Emissions
TOXAIR -25.0 -28.6 -24.9 -10.4 -9.4 -7.9 12.0 11.6 12.3 10.2 11.9 -25.2 8.8
TOXWAT -21.3 -25.0 -21.2 -7.2 -8.4 -5.0 10.1 9.8 12.1 8.9 10.1 -21.6 9.7
TOXSOL -25.1 -28.9 -25.0 -10.0 -9.9 -7.6 12.4 12.0 12.4 10.3 12.4 -25.4 8.9
BIOAIR -28.5 -30.2 -27.9 -25.0 -15.8 -13.8 18.9 18.3 6.3 12.0 13.1 -27.9 5.2
BIOWAT 11.7 10.6 11.7 13.2 -25.0 14.3 13.8 13.9 8.9 11.8 9.8 11.6 12.5
BIOSOL -44.0 -46.3 -43.4 -29.8 -13.5 -25.0 15.4 14.6 11.2 13.7 15.3 -43.5 4.3
SO2 18.4 16.2 18.7 20.7 8.9 20.3 -25.0 -24.9 7.2 0.9 -24.9 18.7 20.5
NO2 18.3 16.2 18.6 20.5 9.0 20.2 -25.1 -25.0 7.2 1.1 -25.0 18.6 20.4
CO2 11.5 10.7 11.9 7.3 -26.3 12.9 -3.3 -3.2 -25.0 2.8 -26.0 11.9 -1.4
VOC 11.4 10.0 11.5 13.3 5.9 13.4 6.4 6.5 11.4 -25.0 6.7 11.4 13.2
PART 17.5 15.5 17.8 19.0 5.1 19.3 -22.7 -22.6 3.8 1.6 -25.0 17.7 18.1
BOD -24.7 -28.5 -24.6 -9.5 -9.9 -7.2 12.3 12.0 12.5 10.3 12.4 -25.0 9.0
TSS 2.7 3.5 3.2 -8.6 -63.4 3.5 19.2 19.3 -59.2 4.3 -27.4 3.3 -25.0Table 3:  Impact of Environmental Policy Reform on Health Endpoints for Santiago
Aggregate Abatement of 25% by Type of Effluent Emission
Health Endpoints toxair toxwat toxsol bioair biowat biosol so2 no2 co voc part bod tss
Premature Mortality/Year 0.5 -0.4 0.6 0.9 -10.3 1.1 -30.3 -30.3 -7.7 -13.0 -32.4 0.6 -0.7
Premature Mortality of males age 40-59/Year -12.6 -13.5 -12.2 -15.8 -24.8 -8.9 1.7 1.6 -10.0 -4.8 -4.8 -12.2 -5.0
RHA/Year 0.3 -0.4 0.4 0.7 -7.7 0.9 -19.5 -19.4 -5.1 -15.2 -20.9 0.4 -0.5
ERV/Year 0.5 -0.4 0.7 0.5 -11.6 1.1 -29.3 -29.2 -8.7 -12.6 -32.1 0.6 -1.3
RAD/Year 0.5 -0.4 0.7 0.5 -11.6 1.1 -29.2 -29.2 -8.7 -12.6 -32.1 0.6 -1.3
LRI/Year (Children < age 17) 0.5 -0.4 0.7 0.5 -11.6 1.1 -29.2 -29.2 -8.7 -12.6 -32.1 0.6 -1.3
Asthma Attacks/Year (Asthmatics) 0.3 -0.3 0.3 0.7 -5.7 0.8 -14.4 -14.4 -3.3 -16.5 -15.1 0.3 -0.1
Respiratory Symptoms/Year 0.4 -0.4 0.5 0.6 -9.1 1.0 -23.0 -22.9 -6.4 -14.3 -24.9 0.5 -0.8
Chronic Bronchitis/Year 0.5 -0.4 0.7 0.5 -11.6 1.1 -29.2 -29.2 -8.7 -12.6 -32.1 0.6 -1.3
MRAD/Year 0.2 -0.3 0.2 0.8 -4.0 0.7 -10.0 -9.9 -1.6 -17.7 -10.0 0.2 0.2
Respiratory Symptoms/Year (Children) 0.5 -0.6 0.6 1.6 -7.4 1.2 -33.2 -33.1 -5.3 -14.2 -33.4 0.6 0.8
Chest Discomfort Episodes/Year 0.5 -0.6 0.6 1.6 -7.3 1.2 -33.1 -33.0 -5.3 -14.2 -33.3 0.6 0.8
Respiratory Symptoms/Year (Adults) 0.4 -0.6 0.6 1.5 -7.1 1.1 -32.6 -32.5 -5.2 -13.8 -32.8 0.5 0.8
Eye Irritations/Year (Adults) 0.2 -0.3 0.2 0.8 -4.0 0.7 -10.0 -9.9 -1.6 -17.7 -10.0 0.2 0.2
Headaches/Year 1.8 1.7 2.0 -8.0 -52.0 1.5 -8.8 -8.7 -42.9 -6.8 -35.4 2.0 -20.4
IQ decrements -12.6 -13.5 -12.2 -15.8 -24.8 -8.9 1.7 1.6 -10.0 -4.8 -4.8 -12.2 -5.0
Cases of Hypertension/1 million males age >20 -12.6 -13.5 -12.2 -15.8 -24.8 -8.9 1.7 1.6 -10.0 -4.8 -4.8 -12.2 -5.0
Non-fatal Heart Attacks/1 million males age 40-59 -12.6 -13.5 -12.2 -15.8 -24.8 -8.9 1.7 1.6 -10.0 -4.8 -4.8 -12.2 -5.0
Note:  All figures are percentage changes with respect to base trends in 2010.
KEY: RHA = respiratory hospital admissions
ERV = emergency room visits
RAD = restricted activity days
LRI = lower respiratory illness
MRAD = minor restricted activity days
pphm = parts per hundred million
µg/m3 = micrograms per cubic meterTable 3 (continued):  Impact of Trade Reform and Combined NAFTA and Environmental Policy Reform on Health Endpoints for Santiago
Trade Policy Reform* Combined NAFTA and Environmental Policy Reform**
Health Endpoints lib2 Nafta2 Mercosur bioairn so2n no2n con vocn partn
Premature Mortality/Year 24.8 3.2 2.0 3.7 -30.6 -30.6 -5.7 -11.4 -32.9
Premature Mortality of males age 40-59/Year 9.2 -0.6 8.4 -15.1 1.3 1.2 -11.6 -5.9 -5.9
RHA/Year 18.7 3.0 1.5 3.4 -18.8 -18.7 -3.0 -14.2 -20.4
ERV/Year 24.2 3.2 1.9 3.4 -29.5 -29.4 -6.9 -10.9 -32.6
RAD/Year 24.2 3.2 1.9 3.4 -29.4 -29.4 -6.8 -10.9 -32.6
LRI/Year (Children < age 17) 24.2 3.2 1.9 3.4 -29.4 -29.4 -6.8 -10.9 -32.6
Asthma Attacks/Year (Asthmatics) 15.9 2.9 1.3 3.4 -13.3 -13.3 -1.0 -16.0 -14.1
Respiratory Symptoms/Year 20.7 3.1 1.6 3.4 -22.6 -22.6 -4.4 -13.0 -24.8
Chronic Bronchitis/Year 24.2 3.2 1.9 3.4 -29.4 -29.4 -6.8 -10.9 -32.6
MRAD/Year 13.5 2.7 1.1 3.4 -8.4 -8.4 0.8 -17.5 -8.5
Respiratory Symptoms/Year (Children) 26.4 3.3 2.2 4.5 -33.8 -33.7 -3.1 -12.6 -34.0
Chest Discomfort Episodes/Year 26.3 3.3 2.2 4.5 -33.6 -33.6 -3.1 -12.6 -33.8
Respiratory Symptoms/Year (Adults) 25.8 3.3 2.1 4.4 -33.1 -33.1 -3.0 -12.2 -33.3
Eye Irritations/Year (Adults) 13.4 2.7 1.1 3.4 -8.4 -8.4 0.8 -17.5 -8.5
Headaches/Year 17.6 3.0 0.2 -5.1 -6.6 -6.5 -43.9 -4.6 -36.3
IQ decrements 9.2 -0.6 8.4 -15.1 1.3 1.2 -11.6 -5.9 -5.9
Cases of Hypertension/1 million males age >20 9.2 -0.6 8.4 -15.1 1.3 1.2 -11.6 -5.9 -5.9
Non-fatal Heart Attacks/1 million males age 40-59 9.2 -0.6 8.4 -15.1 1.3 1.2 -11.6 -5.9 -5.9
*Reflects unilateral trade liberalization, NAFTA integration and MERCOSUR integration by 2010
     with no explicit environmental policy reforms.
**Reflects combined policy reforms of NAFTA integration and aggregate abatement of 25% by type of effluent emission.
Note:  All figures are percentage changes with respect to base trends in 2010.
KEY: RHA = respiratory hospital admissions
ERV = emergency room visits
RAD = restricted activity days
LRI = lower respiratory illness
MRAD = minor restricted activity days
pphm = parts per hundred million
µg/m3 = micrograms per cubic meterTable 3 (continued):  Impact of Coordinated Trade and Environmental Policy Reforms on Health Endpoints for Santiago
Unilateral Trade liberalization with Aggregate Abatement of 25% by Type of Effluent
Emission
Health Endpoints toxairl toxwatl toxsoll bioairl biowatl biosoll so2l no2l col voc partl bodl
Premature Mortality/Year 25.2 22.3 25.6 26.9 6.0 26.9 -29.8 -29.7 5.1 0.5 -32.4
Premature Mortality of males age 40-59/Year -5.9 -7.1 -5.2 -14.3 -24.5 0.9 12.4 12.2 -4.7 -1.4 2.5
RHA/Year 18.9 16.8 19.2 20.2 4.9 20.3 -16.5 -16.4 5.8 -7.2 -18.3
ERV/Year 24.6 21.9 25.0 25.9 4.0 26.3 -28.5 -28.4 3.4 0.8 -32.3
RAD/Year 24.6 21.9 25.0 25.9 4.0 26.2 -28.5 -28.3 3.4 0.8 -32.3
LRI/Year (Children < age 17) 24.6 21.9 25.0 25.9 4.0 26.2 -28.5 -28.3 3.4 0.8 -32.3
Asthma Attacks/Year (Asthmatics) 15.9 14.2 16.2 17.3 5.3 17.2 -10.4 -10.3 7.1 -11.3 -11.1
Respiratory Symptoms/Year 20.9 18.6 21.3 22.3 4.6 22.5 -20.8 -20.7 5.0 -4.3 -23.3
Chronic Bronchitis/Year 24.6 21.9 25.0 25.9 4.0 26.2 -28.5 -28.3 3.4 0.8 -32.3
MRAD/Year 13.3 11.9 13.5 14.7 5.7 14.5 -4.9 -4.8 8.3 -15.0 -4.7
Respiratory Symptoms/Year (Children) 26.8 23.7 27.2 29.4 10.8 28.7 -33.3 -33.1 9.3 -0.2 -33.1
Chest Discomfort Episodes/Year 26.7 23.6 27.1 29.3 10.8 28.5 -33.2 -33.0 9.3 -0.2 -33.0
Respiratory Symptoms/Year (Adults) 26.1 23.1 26.5 28.5 10.7 27.8 -32.8 -32.7 9.0 -0.1 -32.6 26.4 26.7
Eye Irritations/Year (Adults) 13.3 11.9 13.5 14.6 5.7 14.5 -4.9 -4.8 8.2 -15.0 -4.7 13.4 13.7
Headaches/Year 19.0 17.9 19.6 11.0 -49.7 20.4 0.4 0.7 -46.0 4.7 -39.0 19.6 -5.3
IQ decrements -5.9 -7.1 -5.2 -14.3 -24.5 0.9 12.4 12.2 -4.7 -1.4 2.5 -5.1 3.5
Cases of Hypertension/1 million males age >20 -5.9 -7.1 -5.2 -14.3 -24.5 0.9 12.4 12.2 -4.7 -1.4 2.5 -5.1 3.5
Non-fatal Heart Attacks/1 million males age 40-59 -5.9 -7.1 -5.2 -14.3 -24.5 0.9 12.4 12.2 -4.7 -1.4 2.5 -5.1 3.5
Note:  All figures are percentage changes with respect to base trends in 2010.
KEY: RHA = respiratory hospital admissions
ERV = emergency room visits
RAD = restricted activity days
LRI = lower respiratory illness
MRAD = minor restricted activity days
pphm = parts per hundred million
µg/m3 = micrograms per cubic meterTable 4:  Impact of Environmental Policy Reform on Mortality and Morbidity Health Damages for Santiago (in millions 1992 PPP$)
Aggregate Abatement of 25% by Type of Effluent
Health toxair toxwat toxsol bioair biowat biosol so2 no2 co voc part bod tss
Mortality (16) (44) (13) (13) (348) 9 (844) (844) (240) (375) (918) (13) (32)
Morbidity (422) (467) (406) (530) (1,028) (286) (393) (396) (474) (397) (658) (407) (190)
Total (438) (511) (418) (543) (1,376) (276) (1,237) (1,240) (714) (773) (1,576) (419) (222)
Total (% Chile BAU (0.23) (0.27) (0.22) (0.28) (0.72) (0.14) (0.65) (0.65) (0.37) (0.40) (0.82) (0.22) (0.12)
Note:  All mortality and morbidity figures are valued at a reference level of GDP/capita income in 2010 under BAU (measured in 1992 PPP$).
Note:  values represent welfare gains from policy reform relative to BAU in 2010.Table 4 (continued):  Impact of Trade Reform and Combined NAFTA and Environmental Policy Reform on
Mortality and                 Morbidity Health Damages for Santiago (in millions 1992 PPP$)
Trade Policy Reform* Combined NAFTA and Environmental Policy Reform**
Health Damages lib2 Nafta2 Mercosur bioairn so2n no2n con vocn partn
Mortality 716 88 76 67 (853) (853) (187) (333) (935)
Morbidity 703 34 317 (457) (405) (408) (494) (409) (699)
Total 1,419 122 393 (389) (1,258) (1,262) (682) (743) (1,634)
Total (% Chile BAU GDP) 0.74 0.06 0.21 (0.20) (0.66) (0.66) (0.36) (0.39) (0.85)
*Reflects unilateral trade liberalization, NAFTA integration and MERCOSUR integration by 2010
     with no explicit environmental policy reforms.
**Reflects combined policy reforms of NAFTA integration and aggregate abatement of 25% by type of effluent emission.
Note:  All mortality and morbidity figures are valued at a reference level of GDP/capita in 2010 under BAU (measured in 1992 PPP$).
Note: values in parentheses represent welfare gains from policy reform relative to BAU in 2010.
Table 4 (continued):  Impact of Coordinated Trade and Environmental Policy Reforms on Mortality and Morbidity Health Damages
for Santiago (in 1992 PPP$)
Aggregate Abatement of 25% by Type of Effluent
Health toxair toxwat toxsol bioair biowat biosol so2 no2 co voc part bod tss
Mortality 691 607 704 718 109 755 (804) (802) 131 11 (901) 701 683
Morbidity 193 109 224 (71) (764) 452 (3) (6) (90) (79) (397) 225 488
Total 884 716 927 647 (656) 1,207 (806) (808) 41 (68) (1,297) 927 1,171
Total (% Chile BAU 0.46 0.37 0.48 0.34 (0.34) 0.63 (0.42) (0.42) 0.02 (0.04) (0.68) 0.48 0.61
Note:  All mortality and morbidity figures are valued at a reference level of GDP/capita income in 2010 under BAU (measured in 1992 PPP$).
Note: values in parentheses represent welfare gains from policy reform relative to BAU in   2010.